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Abstract: I estimate achievement effects of education public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
in 17 countries on the 2009 PISA assessment. Enrollment in PPP schools is tied to  student 
wealth and prior academic ability. PPP students outperform their public peers on half of 
all outcomes. After accounting for selection, the PPP performance advantage remains on 
one-quarter of outcomes. However, nearly all of these performance differences are 
accounted for by school-level peer group effects. PPP schools are outperforming their 
public counterparts not through any advantages in productive efficiency but through 
sorting of more capable students.  
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La efectividad y la equidad de las alianzas público-privadas en educación: Una 
evaluación cuasi-experimental de 17 países 
Resumen: Estimo los efectos de logro de las alianzas público-privadas (PPP) educativas 
en 17 países en la evaluación PISA 2009. La inscripción en las escuelas PPP está ligada a la 
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riqueza estudiantil y la capacidad académica previa. Los estudiantes de PPP superan a sus 
pares públicos en la mitad de todos los resultados. Después de tomar en cuenta la 
selección, la ventaja de rendimiento de PPP permanece en una cuarta parte de los 
resultados. Sin embargo, casi todas estas diferencias de rendimiento se explican por los 
efectos del grupo de iguales a nivel escolar. Las escuelas PPP están superando a  sus 
contrapartes públicas no por ninguna ventaja en la eficiencia productiva, sino por la 
clasificación de estudiantes más capaces.  
Palabras clave: alianzas público-privadas; cupones; elección de escuela; efectos de pares; 
PISA 
 
A eficácia e a equidade das parcerias público-privadas na educação: Uma avaliação 
quase experimental de 17 países 
Resumo: Estimo os efeitos de realização de parcerias de educação público-privadas 
(PPPs) em 17 países na avaliação do PISA 2009. A inscrição em escolas de PPP está 
vinculada à riqueza dos estudantes e à capacidade acadêmica anterior. Os alunos de PPP 
superam seus pares em metade de todos os resultados. Depois de levar em consideração a 
seleção, a vantagem de desempenho do PPP permanece em um quarto dos resultados. No 
entanto, quase todas essas diferenças de desempenho são explicadas pelos efeitos do grupo 
de pares no nível da escola. As escolas de PPP estão superando suas contrapartes públicas 
não por causa de qualquer vantagem em eficiência produtiva, mas por causa da 
classificação de alunos mais capacitados. 
Palavras-chave: parcerias público-privadas; cupões; escolha escolar; efeitos de pares; PISA  
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Introduction 
Government interaction with the private sector has become increasingly common in 
education policy making in countries around the world. In particular, states seem to be exploring the 
potential benefits of market-related education interventions by funding various types of private 
education initiatives (Jimenez, Hofman, Velez, & Patrinos, 2011; LaRocque & Lee, 2011). The term 
‘public-private partnership’ (PPP) is a generic descriptor, which captures any form of shared 
responsibility between government and private actors across the spheres of school finance, 
ownership, and management (LaRocque & Lee, 2011; Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guaqueta, 2009). 
Education PPPs are not a particularly new phenomenon. Different combinations of school finance, 
management, and ownership are prevalent across the world, and have historically been important 
components of national education systems in low-, middle- and upper-income countries (Baum, 
Lewis, Lusk-Stover, & Patrinos, 2014; Patrinos et al., 2009). An increasing amount of research 
demonstrates the growth of such arrangements for delivering and financing basic education services 
in systems across Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific, and Africa (Brewer & 
Hentschke, 2009; Epple, Romano, & Urquiola, 2015; Morgan, Petrosino, & Fronius, 2015; Patrinos, 
2013). Government interest in establishing PPPs in education is typically driven by one or more of 
the following aims: (1) to increase the quality of education services, (2) to increase access to (and 
participation in) basic education, and (3) to meet one or more of these objectives at a lower cost 
relative to public provision (Patrinos et al., 2009).  
Notwithstanding the existing research on the subject, empirical evidence investigating the 
achievement and equity impacts of education PPPs on students is still greatly lacking, with relatively 
few rigorously sound evaluations of these programs. Many countries’ PPP models have received 
little empirical attention; and, to my knowledge, no study has yet attempted to assess the impact of 
education PPPs systematically across multiple countries. This study provides a quasi-experimental 
evaluation of delivery-based PPPs (i.e., partnerships that combine public finance with private 
provision) across a range of countries, using data from the 2009 Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). Using propensity score matching to account for the non-random 
selection of students into schools, I estimate the achievement effects of attending a PPP school 
within 17 different countries. I investigate whether any performance differences can be explained by 
the productive efficiency of schools, or are simply attributable to differences in student peer group 
composition between public and PPP schools. Lastly, drawing upon the robust body of research that 
finds privatization to be related to social stratification (Epple & Romano, 2008; Hsieh & Urquiola, 
2006; Ladd, Fiske, & Ruijs, 2010), I analyze the extent to which participation in PPP schools is 
conditioned by student background characteristics such as socioeconomic status and prior academic 
ability. 
Public-Private Partnerships in Education 
Public-private partnerships disrupt the traditional approach to delivering education services. 
Whereas, historically, most education systems have been built upon public finance and provision of 
education, partnerships between state and non-state entities have explored approaches for sharing 
these responsibilities in various combinations. Although private school voucher programs—those 
which direct government funds to students to attend the private schools of their choice—are the 
strategy that seem to have received the most attention in the research literature (Epple, Romano, & 
Urquiola, 2015; Neal, 2002), other PPP models include government subsidies to private schools 
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(sometimes known as ‘aided-schools’ or ‘dependent’ private schools), and privately managed 
schools—such as in the U.S. charter school model.   
The Theoretical Rationale of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships 
The theoretical rationale underlying private education suggests that market forces have the 
potential to improve school governance, increase accountability to students and parents, and 
improve student cognitive outcomes at a lower cost than providing all basic education services 
through the state (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 2000a; Macleod & Urquiola, 2012). Public-private 
partnerships are meant to facilitate high performance of schools, teachers, and students by 
leveraging private sector activity and increasing levels of school choice, competition, accountability, 
and autonomy (Baum et al., 2014; Gauri & Vawda, 2003). These improvements are made possible 
through contractual relationships between providers and the state (Jimenez et al., 2011; LaRocque & 
Lee, 2011), and by fostering competition and choice while controlling standards and objectives 
through state regulation and quality assurance mechanisms (Neal, 2002; Sakellariou & Patrinos, 
2009). 
The primary critical argument against private education centers on the social impacts of 
market-based education delivery: namely, that increased privatization attenuates social disparities of 
educational access (Apple, 2001; Klees, 2012; Levin & Belfield, 2003). For example, studies across 
countries have shown rather consistently that universal school choice programs are likely to facilitate 
sorting of more socioeconomically privileged students into private schools, thus reinforcing social 
inequalities in accessing the highest quality education services (Epple & Romano, 2008; Hsieh & 
Urquiola, 2006; Ladd et al., 2010). 
Evidence on the Effectiveness of Delivery-based PPPs  
In general terms, the existing research finds mixed results regarding the impacts of education 
PPPs on student academic achievement. In the United States, although there are some clear cases of 
high performing charter schools (Abdulkadiroǧlu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, & Pathak, 2011; Angrist, 
Cohodes, Dynarski, Pathak, & Walters, 2013; Tuttle et al., 2013), systematic reviews and cross-state 
studies find that charter schools, on average, tend to perform on par with traditional public schools, 
with the exception of superior charter performance for more disadvantaged schools and students 
(for example, in poorer, urban locations; Clark, Gleason, Tuttle, & Silverberg, 2015; CREDO, 2015; 
Epple, Romano, & Zimmer, 2015). Experiences with privately-managed public schools in the 
Netherlands and Latin America, however, have demonstrated some positive results in terms of 
student access, progression, and achievement (Barrera-Osorio, 2006; Patrinos, 2013; Sánchez, 
Clavijo, Espinel, & Arias, 2015; Swope & Latorre, 2000).  
Policy experience with school voucher programs, both in and out of the United States, has 
been met with similar mixed results (Epple, Romano, & Urquiola, 2015; Neal, 2002). At the macro 
level, universal voucher programs have been ineffective in their attempts to spark system-wide 
performance improvements through increased choice and competition (Macleod & Urquiola, 2012). 
However, targeted vouchers in multiple countries have experienced marked success in increasing 
access to schooling for previously underserved students, and in raising student learning for targeted 
groups of underperforming students (Adelman, Holland, & Heidelk, 2017; Angrist, Bettinger, 
Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2013). 
The Role of Peer Effects in School Sector Performance 
A concern with respect to research on the relative effectiveness of school sectors questions 
whether differences in performance are due to increased productive efficiency of public or private 
schools, or simply due to a redistribution (i.e., “cream skimming”) of high-ability students into a 
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more privileged school sector, as has been found in the case of private school voucher programs 
(Arenas, 2004; Epple, Romano, & Urquiola, 2015; Kremer & Holla, 2009). If the impact of PPP 
programs is due solely to sorting of students, such programs would benefit the privileged at the 
expense of the disadvantaged (as the overall quality of peers in the system is fixed), and would create 
negative externalities for the larger education system (Bettinger, Kremer, & Saavedra, 2010; Hsieh & 
Urquiola, 2006; Uribe, Murnane, Willett, & Somers, 2006). Within the empirical literature there is 
strong evidence to suggest that peer group composition has substantial import for the performance 
of students within private and PPP schools—wherein students will perform better when surrounded 
by higher-achieving peers (Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003; Hoxby, 2000b). 
Abdulkadiroǧlu et al. (2011), Angrist, Cohodes, et al. (2013), and Nichols-Barrer, Gill, Gleason, & 
Tuttle (2014) find that peer effects account for some of the performance advantage of charter 
schools in the United States. In their study of achievement of Bogota’s public and private subsidized 
schools, Uribe et al. (2006) also found peer effects to be important determinants of student 
academic performance. Conversely, when increasing the share of lower-performing peers in a 
school, one will find negative impacts on classroom behavior, on teacher pedagogical practices, and 
on the achievement of average students (Imberman, Kugler, & Sacerdote, 2012; Lavy, Paserman, & 
Schlosser, 2011).  
Somers, McEwan, and Willms, (2004) argue that many studies of the effects of private 
schools have incorrectly mistaken a private sector peer group effect for a private school advantage in 
productive efficiency, as a result of failing to account for the effect of student peer groups. In their 
own study of private school effectiveness across 10 countries in Latin America, these researchers 
find no performance difference between public and private schools, after accounting for student 
peer group differences. As such, research into school performance that fails to account for student 
peer group characteristics is liable to overestimate productive efficiency, attributing the performance 
spillovers of the student peer group to the school itself. 
Study Sample 
The populations of interest for this study include students in participating PISA countries 
that are enrolled in (1) public schools and (2) publicly-funded private schools. Of the 65 countries 
that participated in the 2009 PISA assessment, 43 include samples from both of these populations. 
For each of these countries, I conducted a priori power analyses to determine which had large 
enough student and school sample sizes to produce significant and meaningful results from the 
statistical tests. Through this analysis, I identified 17 countries with sample sizes large enough to 
produce significant results at α = .05, with a .30 effect size and statistical power of .80, accounting 
for the degree of between-school variation in PISA outcomes (the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC)): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. In practice, the majority of these countries have sample sizes far above the minimum 
threshold for detecting significant effects at this level—such that detection of much smaller effect 
sizes is possible.  
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There are important differences in the size of the PPP sector across countries. Figure 1 
presents shares of total enrollment by school sector. In four of the 17 countries, more than 40% of 
students are enrolled in state-funded private schools: Belgium (61%), the Netherlands (61%), Ireland 
(44%), and Chile (40%). For Belgium, the Netherlands, and Chile, these large PPP sectors are the 
result of national voucher programs, wherein the state pays for the education of students in a large 
number of eligible private schools. In Ireland the government subsidizes a large number of students 
to study within private secondary institutions. In an additional five countries—Argentina, Australia, 
Denmark, Korea, and Spain—between 15% and 25% of age-15 students are enrolled in state-funded 
private schools. Averaging across the set of countries, PPP schools receive the same amount of 
funding from the state as government schools (roughly 81% of total school funds). 
Figure 1. Share of total enrollments by school sector and country 
 
Additionally, there are differences in the composition of students between sectors across 
countries. Point-biserial correlations show that enrollment in a PPP school is associated with higher 
student socioeconomic status in 13 of the 17 countries. The magnitudes of these correlations range 
from .025 in Thailand to .311 in Argentina, with a cross-country mean correlation of .088. In 
Indonesia, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Portugal, the correlation between school sector and 
student SES favors the public sector, ranging from -.088 in Hungary to -.283 in South Korea, with a 
cross country mean correlation of .181. All 17 of these relationships are significant at p < .001. The 
higher SES levels of the private school students appears to be driven in part by the higher household 
cost of attending these schools. Across countries, PPP schools fund roughly 4% more of their 
school budget through student fees than do public schools. In 11 countries, average SES is 
significantly higher for students in PPP schools than for students in public schools. In only two 
countries—Indonesia and South Korea—do students in public schools have higher SES than 
students in PPP schools. 
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Data and Variables 
This study uses student achievement data from the 2009 Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), the global initiative that aims to assess the preparedness of 15-year-olds 
to meet the needs of today’s knowledge-based economies (OECD, 2009). The exam assesses student 
abilities across the subjects of reading, mathematics, and science. More than 470,000 students 
participated in the PISA assessment in 2009, representing populations of roughly 26 million students 
across 65 participating countries. The PISA exam utilizes a two-stage stratified sampling design, with 
schools as the primary sampling unit, and students as the secondary sampling unit. To account for 
the unequal probability of student selection across schools (and sampling strata) all statistical 
analyses include probability weights to accurately reflect representation of the population of 15-year-
old students nationwide.  
The dependent variables of interest in this study are student math, reading, and science 
scores. The PISA testing procedure utilizes a method for estimating a range of each student’s 
performance across a set of five plausible values (OECD, 2009). PISA reports these scores using a 
normed scale with an OECD mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Accurate analysis of 
these plausible values requires that each statistical test is computed five times, and the average of the 
results reported.   
The treatment variable of interest—school sector—is represented by a binary variable 
(PUBPRIV), which equals 1 for PPP schools and 0 for government schools.1 A PPP school is 
defined as being operated privately while receiving at least 50% of total funding from the 
government. As such, this category captures private schools receiving government funds through 
subsidies, voucher programs, or private management contracts; although, it is unfortunately unable 
to distinguish between the three. The covariates selected for propensity matching within this study 
were those, described above, that the research literature shows to significantly predict selection into 
private schools, including student sex, grade, immigration status, native language, attitudes towards 
school, family structure, and school location.   
The PISA variable GRADE indicates the student grade relative to the modal grade for 15-
year-olds in each particular country. For example, values of -1 and 2 represent students that are 
respectively one year below and two years above the modal grade.  
 For measuring student attitudes towards school, I use a composite factor variable derived 
from four indicators of student school attitudes: (1) school has done little to prepare me for adult 
life; (2) school has been a waste of time; (3) school has helped give me confidence to make 
decisions; (4) school has taught me things which could be useful in a job. Negatively phrased items 
are reverse coded. Higher values on this variable indicate a more positive attitude towards school.    
 A PISA variable of immigration status (IMMIG) is used to create dichotomous variables 
representing each immigration category: (1) native; (2) second-generation (student born in the 
country, parents born in another country); and (3) first-generation (student and parents born outside 
the country). Immigration status has been shown to significantly predict private school attendance 
and school cognitive outcomes and is particularly impactful in many European contexts (Dronkers, 
van der Velden, & Dunne, 2011).  
 A dichotomous variable with value of 1 indicates that the language of the test is the primary 
language spoken at home. A value of 0 indicates that the language of the test is not the primary 
language spoken at home. 
                                                 
1 Students in private independent schools (i.e., private schools that receive less than half of their total funding 
from the state) are not included in this study. 
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 The PISA composite factor variable ESCS contains information from numerous variables 
representing a range of family economic, wealth, and cultural information. Larger values represent 
higher socioeconomic status. This variable combines information from three separate indices: 
1. The family home possession index captures information from four separate PISA 
measures:  
a. Family wealth: a measure combining information pertaining to a number of 
student and family possessions: student has a room of his/her own, internet 
link, dishwasher, DVD or VCR, three country-specific wealth items, cell 
phones, TVs, computers, cars, rooms with bath or shower. 
b. Home educational resources: a measure combining information regarding 
various educational resources at home: student has a desk to study at, a 
quiet place to study, a computer he/she can use for work, educational 
software, his/her own calculator, books to help with school work, a 
dictionary. 
c. Cultural possessions: this measure combines information pertaining to a 
number of cultural possessions at home, such as whether the home has 
classic literature, books of poetry, and works of art. 
d. Number of books in the home. 
2. Highest occupational status of parents: this variable uses Ganzeboom, De Graaf, 
and Treiman's (1992) internationally-comparable index of occupational status. If the 
student has more than one parent, the highest value is used. Higher scores indicate 
higher occupational status. 
3. Highest educational level of parents, recorded in number of years of education. If 
the student has more than one parent, the highest value is used. 
 
I use the PISA family structure variable (FAMSTRUC) to create dichotomous indicators for family 
type: (1) single-parent family, (2) two-parent nuclear family, and (3) mixed family. Using the PISA 
school community variable (SC04Q01), I create dichotomous indicators to signify each community 
size: (1) village (fewer than 3,000 people), (2) small town (3,000 to about 15,000 people), (3) town 
(15,000 to about 100,000 people), (4) city (100,000 to about 1,000,000 people), and (5) large city 
(more than 1,000,000 people). 
I assess the impact of peer effects on student achievement using a composite measure of 
average school socioeconomic status (AGGSES), an aggregated variable created from the individual 
student SES variable, ESCS. At the student level, ESCS has an OECD mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. Additionally, the explanatory variable, GFUND, indicates the share of school funding 
provided by the government. This school finance variable is included in some of the statistical 
models, as the level of funding received from the state may influence the behavior of recipient 
schools (Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, & West, 2007).   
Descriptive statistics (pooled across country samples) are provided for the key covariates in 
Table 1. Mean differences show that, on average, students in PPP schools tend to come from more 
advantaged households, are more likely to come from two-parent families, and are more likely to 
reside in urban areas. Meanwhile, public school students, on average, are reporting more positive 
attitudes towards school, are more likely to be native-born, and are generally found in higher grades.  
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Table 1  
International descriptive statistics for student-level pre- and post-matching covariates 
 Public schools 
 
 
Publicly-
funded 
private 
schools 
 Standardized mean difference 
 
Pre-
match 
mean 
Post-
match 
mean 
 Mean  
Pre-
match 
Post-
match 
Percent 
balance 
improvement 
Sample size 269,251 42,128  42,128     
Student covariates         
Propensity score .121 .219  .227  .753 .053 93.2 
Female .507 .510  .510  .006 .013 78.2 
Attitude towards school .093 -.010  -.028  -.129 .067 85.6 
Grade -.170 -.271  -.306  -.189 .146 74.8 
Language .892 .846  .879  -.041 .109 -156.8 
Immigration status         
   Native .897 .776  .787  -.267 .115 89.6 
   Second generation .044 .132  .127  .252 .107 94.1 
   First generation .036 .076  .069  .131 .046 80.7 
Family covariates         
Socioeconomic status -.356 -.116  -.161  .184 .154 77.2 
Family structure         
   Single parent family .169 .158  .148  -.059 .029 51.0 
   Two parent family .753 .791  .805  .132 .035 72.7 
   Mixed family .039 .027  .025  -.087 .024 87.4 
School covariates         
School community         
   Village .098 .044  .046  -.245 .027 94.9 
   Small town .241 .134  .136  -.307 .042 98.1 
   Town .331 .258  .270  -.137 .039 80.9 
   City .228 .325  .345  .248 .107 82.3 
   Large city .099 .238  .201  .253 .122 64.2 
Share of gov. funding .809 .812  .815  .006 .013 12.2 
Note: Descriptive statistics presented here are pooled across countries in the international sample 
 
Methodological Approach 
Linear Regression 
I apply three methodological approaches—all used in prior studies of the relative 
effectiveness of public and private schools (French & Kingdon, 2010)—to produce estimates of the 
effect of attending a PPP school. The first approach estimates two-level linear regression models (via 
maximum likelihood estimation), with the school sector dummy variable—PUBPRIV—included to 
indicate student enrollment in a government-funded private (as opposed to a public) school. The 
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first model examines the unconditional achievement differences between students in public schools 
and PPP schools. This step applies a ‘means-as-outcomes’ model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002):  
Yij = γ00 + γ01 (PUBPRIV j) + u0j + rij    (1) 
In this mixed (two-level) model, Yij represents the achievement outcome of student i in school j. The 
coefficient γ01 captures the treatment effect of attending a PPP school (PUBPRIV). Model 1 is run 
separately for each country and exam subject (17 countries × 3 exams subjects = 51 models). 
However, given the absence of student- or school-level covariates, apart from the school sector 
dummy, the results for γ01 provide biased estimates of the effect of attending a PPP school. Model 2 
adds a vector of observed student demographic characteristics (X ) to account for systematic 
observable differences between public and PPP students.  
 Yij = γ00 + γ01 (PUBPRIV j) + γ10 Xij + u0j + rij    (2) 
Insofar as X captures the full set of student characteristics that determines selection of a PPP versus 
a private school, γ01 from model 2 will provide the causal effect of PPP school enrollment on student 
achievement. However, if there are any unobserved factors (e.g., ability, motivation, or resources of 
the student or household) outside of X that contribute to private school enrollment and also 
influence student achievement, the estimated private school causal effect will be biased. Such bias 
will be captured by the student level-error term in the model, rij.  
To account for the effect of school peers on a student’s academic achievement within public 
and PPP schools, I follow studies such as Ammermueller & Pischke (2009), McEwan (2003), and 
Schneeweis & Winter-Ebmer (2007), which use school-level data on student socioeconomic status 
to account for peer effects. By adding a school-level aggregate measure of student socioeconomic 
status (AGGSES), the model ensures that the effect of being in a school with different compositions 
of peers is not conflated with relative differences in public and private school effectiveness. 
Additionally, this model includes a school-level variable—GFUND—indicating the share of school 
funding provided by the state, which has been shown in prior research to predict performance of 
students in private schools (Wößmann et al., 2007): 
Yij = γ00 + γ01 (PUBPRIV j) + γ02 (AGGSES j) + γ03 (GFUND j) + γ10 Xij + u0j + rij    (3) 
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
 The second approach used for investigating the performance differences between students 
in public and PPP schools is a decomposition of public and PPP student achievement using the 
method of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Although the method was initially developed for the 
estimation of labor market wage differentials, it has more recently been applied in a number of 
studies on the relative performance of public and private school students, as a means of parsing out 
the school sector achievement difference into the portion accounted for by school productivity and 
the portion attributable to differences in student endowments (i.e., observable characteristics). 
Whereas the linear regression models 2 and 3 fit single achievement functions for the pooled public 
and PPP students, the Oaxaca-Blinder approach fits separate achievement models for public and 
PPP students: 
YiPub = βPub XiPub + µiPub     (4) 
YiPPP = βPPP XiPPP + µiPPP     (5) 
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In these models, Y represents the performance of student i, controlling for observed student 
characteristics X, in both public (Pub) and PPP schools. Models 4 and 5 are used to predict the 
outcome for a hypothetical student with the average characteristics of the pooled student 
population, first using the coefficients obtained from model 4 and then from model 5. This 
estimates the achievement of our hypothetical student, if enrolled in a public and then a PPP school. 
The relative effectiveness of public versus PPP schools is given by the difference in predicted scores: 
(?̂?Pub – ?̂?PPP). The Oaxaca-Blinder framework separates the difference in school sector performance 
into a component due to observed student population differences and a component representing 
school effectiveness, conditional on student characteristics (however, this second component may 
also reflect the influence of unobservable student characteristics). Although the approach does not 
account for unobservable differences between school sectors, at the very least it proves useful in 
quantifying the extent to which observable differences in student compositions are responsible for 
any school sector advantage. 
Propensity Score Matching 
As a final approach for estimating the private versus PPP achievement differential, I run 
models 2 and 3 on adjusted samples of public and PPP students in each country, after constructing 
equivalent treatment and comparison groups through a propensity score matching framework. This 
approach attempts to address the endogenous bias introduced by non-random selection of students 
into schools. The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of assignment to a 
particular treatment (e.g., enrollment in a PPP school) as a function of a vector of observed student 
characteristics (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1997). The ability of PSM to closely match the 
estimates produced by randomized experiments is dependent upon the assumption of a treatment 
assignment that is strongly ignorable (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Conceptually, this is satisfied in 
the existence of treatment and control units that are perfectly matched on the propensity score 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). Thus, for public and private students with the same probability of 
attending a private school, the difference between means is an unbiased estimate of the average 
treatment effect (D’Agostino & Rubin, 2000). 
Satisfying this condition requires a set of covariates capable of matching public and private 
students by likelihood of private school attendance—an aim best met through observable covariates 
that have been shown to determine private school attendance (Bai, 2011; Rubin, 1997). I draw upon 
the large body of previous empirical research to identify the determinants of this selection process—
finding certain family, student, and community characteristics to be predictive of student enrollment 
in private schools. For example, in many cases, where private education requires more private 
investment than public education, family income is a significant predictor of private school 
attendance (Figlio & Stone, 2001; Long & Toma, 1988). Other important covariates that are 
empirically linked to private school attendance include family structure, family socioeconomic status, 
family size, homeownership, parent education, parent occupation, parent and student immigration 
status, parental involvement in the child’s education, student sex, race, educational ability, school 
average socioeconomic status and size of the city of residence (Andersen, 2008; Betts & Fairlie, 
2001; Buddin, Cordes, & Kirby, 1998; Escardibul & Villarroya, 2009; Figlio & Stone, 2001; Lankford 
& Wyckoff, 2001; Long & Toma, 1988). As presented in the data section above, those variables that 
are mentioned here as important to private school enrollment, and are included (or some similar 
measure) in the PISA 2009 database, are used to calculate the propensity score.  
Propensity scores were calculated by regressing the dichotomous school sector variable on 
the set of student and household covariates. In line with Dehejia & Wahba (2002), I use a ‘nearest-
neighbor’ matching algorithm to match every PPP student to the public student with the nearest 
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propensity score. The result is a statistically-constructed comparison group of public school 
students, equal in sample size to the treatment group, and much more similar on important 
background measures than the original data (Rutkowski & Rutkowski, 2008). The extent of this 
balance is assessed after each matching iteration.  
In the case of three countries—Chile, Ireland, and the Netherlands—there were insufficient 
students in the public sector to allow for nearest-neighbor matching. In these instances, a process of 
exact matching using only three covariates (student socioeconomic status, grade, and attitude towards 
school) was followed. These results should be treated with caution, as treatment and control groups 
may not be balanced across omitted covariates; however, given that SES is the covariate with 
potentially the largest impact on private enrollment, and is composed of nearly 20 other student 
background characteristics, the exact matches still capture a rich set of self-selection determinants. 
The more pertinent issue is the substantial loss of data resulting from incomplete matching 
(McKinlay, 1975; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). In Chile, Ireland, and the Netherlands, only 13.7%, 
7%, and 19.4% of the cases remain after exact matching. Thus, while the ability to compare these 
students with identical family backgrounds is beneficial, the results should not be considered 
representative of the PPP sector effects at the national level for these three countries.   
Assessing propensity score overlap and covariate balance. To satisfy the ignorability 
condition assumed within the propensity score causal framework, in the absence of perfect 
propensity score matches between treatment and control groups, adequate overlap in the 
distribution of propensity scores between treatment and control groups must be demonstrated. 
Without an empirical test to assess overlap, a visual inspection of distributions is typically used. 
Figure 2 shows the overlap in the distribution of propensity scores in treatment and comparison 
groups following the matching process, with high levels of overlap apparent in nearly all country 
samples2. Perhaps the one exception is the case of Spain, wherein the propensity score distribution 
for PPP students (dotted line) shows a bimodal distribution with a higher mean than the unimodal 
distribution of the public student distribution (solid line). For the remaining countries, however, 
results suggest that there is sufficient overlap to satisfy the ignorability assumption.  
Following the matching process within each country, I assess covariate balance between 
groups. In line with Cochran (1968), I use standardized mean differences of less than 0.2 between 
treatment and control groups as the threshold for covariate balance (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007; 
Imai, King, & Stuart, 2008). Table 1 displays the changes in balance for the pooled international 
sample of students before and after propensity score matching. The matching process was successful 
in producing standardized public-private differences less than the critical value (.2) on all covariates. 
I call particular attention to the changes in the average propensity score, where standardized 
differences were significantly reduced (from .753 to .053). Figure 3 shows the pre-post changes in 
standardized mean differences between treatment and control groups on all covariates for all 
countries, with reduction in bias between public and PPP sectors after propensity score matching.  
 
                                                 
2 Common support is not assessed for Chile, Ireland, and the Netherlands. The exact matching process used 
for these countries inherently results in perfect matches, and thus satisfaction of the ignorability condition.   
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Figure 2. Common support between treatment and matched propensity scores 
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Figure 3. Pre-post changes in all covariate standardized mean differences (all countries)  
Findings3 
Linear Regression Models and Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions 
Before accounting for the selection bias between public and PPP schools, I asses the 
unconditional performance differences between students in these two sectors. Across countries and 
subjects (on a total of 51 outcomes), I find 27 positive significant4 effects, 18 non-significant effects, 
and 6 negative significant effects (Table 2). That is, without adjusting for systematic differences in 
student populations, PPP schools outperform public schools in all PISA subjects in just over half (9) 
of the countries. The means of all positive significant effects are 37.4 in math (0.41 SD), 44.1 in 
reading (0.48 SD), and 43.4 in science (0.46 SD) PISA points. In unconditional differences, public 
schools outperform PPP schools in two countries: Indonesia and Trinidad & Tobago, with an 
average difference of 39.7 (math), 54.4 (reading), and 37.8 (science).  
Averaging across countries, the unadjusted difference in pooled school sector performance is 
16.1 (math), 19.4 (reading), and 20.6 (science), in favor of PPP schools. The results from the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Table 2) show that, for countries with significant differences in 
outcomes between sectors, observed student characteristics account for between 25.3% (Chile, 
science) and 90.5% (Hungary, math) of the school sector differential. Averaging across those 
countries with significant sector differences, between 45% and 50% of the difference in achievement 
outcomes between sectors is attributable to observed differences in student characteristics.  
Recognizing the importance of these student characteristics in explaining the achievement of 
public and PPP schools, my second two-level linear regression (model 2) adds to the unconditional 
model a set of student-level control variables, to adjust for differences in student characteristics. 
Table 3 shows that, after controlling for the set of student covariates (in the columns labelled 
“Sector Effect” under model 2), the number of positive significant effects decreases from 27 to 19 
across countries and subjects, while the number of negative significant effects remained at 6. The 
means of all positive significant coefficients decreased from 37.4 to 20.9 in math, from 44.1 to 29.2 
                                                 
3 Due to the amount of data produced by running models for 17 countries and 3 exam subjects, the page 
limits of the paper restrict me from providing the full set of results from each statistical model. As such, the 
key results most pertinent to interpreting the school sector effect are presented here, and any additional 
results are available by request from the author. 
4 A positive effect signifies a performance advantage for students in PPP schools, while a negative effect 
signifies a performance advantage for students in public schools.  
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in reading, and from 43.4 to 32.2 in science.  The means of the negative significant effects decreased 
from 39.7 to 32.0 in math, from 54.4 to 45.8 in reading, and from 37.8 to 17.5 in science. The mean 
school sector coefficient, averaged across countries, decreased from 16.1 to 8.1 in math, from 19.4 
to 10.2 in reading, and from 20.6 to 10.6 in science. The results presented in the columns labelled 
“Oaxaca,” provide the amount of the unadjusted school sector differences as explained by student 
population differences (‘endowment’) and either school effectiveness or unobservable student 
characteristics (‘sector effect’). In summary, after controlling for observed student characteristics 
within a two-level linear regression model, the PPP sector advantage was reduced, with fewer 
significant effects and smaller coefficients. However, there remains a measurable performance gap in 
favor of PPP schools across a number of countries and subjects.  
Propensity Score Matching 
Following the matching procedure, I find further reductions in the PPP sector effect in 
terms of the size of the school sector coefficients and the marginal share of explained variation in 
PISA performance. Before matching, school sector accounts for as much as 20.9% (Chile, reading) 
of the variation in achievement scores across countries (Table 4). However, this effect is reduced by 
more than 50% across countries after propensity score matching. In Spain, school sector accounts 
for one-tenth the amount of variation in reading scores after matching (from 14.2% to 1.3%). 
Similar trends are seen in many of the countries of interest (Table 4). 
 The number and magnitude of significant school sector coefficients is also reduced after 
propensity score matching. Compared to the pre-match linear regression models with student 
covariates, the number of positive significant effects decreases from 19 to 13 after propensity score 
matching (while still controlling for student characteristics in the analytical model, Table 5). After 
matching, there are no longer any public school achievement advantages (down from 6 at the 
previous stage). The means of the positive significant coefficients increased from 20.9 to 26.8 (0.30 
SD) in math, decreased from 29.2 to 26.1 (0.29 SD) in reading, and decreased from 32.2 to 28.8 
(0.32 SD) in science.  In only three countries—Argentina, Belgium, and Chile—do PPP students 
outperform matched public students on all three PISA subjects. The largest private sector 
advantages are found in Argentina. Findings from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition provide strong 
evidence in support of the effectiveness of the propensity score matching in balancing treatment and 
control groups by observable characteristics. Following the matching procedure, in only two 
countries—Spain and Trinidad and Tobago—do observed student characteristics explain any of the 
difference in achievement between public and PPP schools after matching (see ‘Endowments’ 
column in Table 5). Additionally, following the matching procedure, only in 8 country-subjects do 
private school productivity or unobservable characteristics provide a PPP learning advantage (see 
‘Sector Effect’ columns in Table 5). 
These results suggest that after matching students on important background characteristics, 
in the majority of cases (74%) there are no differences between school sectors. When differences do 
exist, they are more likely to favor PPP schools. These differences, however, are not large in 
magnitude. Averaging coefficients across countries, students in PPP schools score 3.3, 4.4, and 6.0 
PISA points higher in math, reading, and science than their matched public school peers  (Table 5). 
Assessing the Role of Peer Effects 
To determine whether performance differences between public and PPP schools may be 
attributable to the composition of the student’s peer group rather than to any particular behavior of 
the school itself, I run two-level models (model 3) before and after propensity score matching, 
which include the full set of student-level controls and three school-level factors: school sector, 
share of government funding, and average student socioeconomic status.  
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Table 2 
Unconditional PPP school effect (model 1) and Oaxaca-Blinder estimates representing the share of sector 
difference attributable to student observable characteristics  
Country Math  Reading 
 
Science 
 
Mean 
 Sector 
effect 
Oaxaca   
Sector 
effect 
Oaxaca   
Sector 
effect 
Oaxaca   Coefficient 
Argentina 69.2*** 0.322  43.6** 0.327  80.3*** 0.311  64.4 
 (13.0)   (14.0)   (14.5)    
Australia 25.0*** 0.624  37.3*** 0.560  32.0*** 0.543  31.4 
 (5.7)   (5.6)   (6.0)    
Austria 41.5** 0.308  56.0*** 0.416  56.0*** 0.292  51.2 
 (13.9)   (14.6)   (14.6)    
Belgium 24.9* 0.343  30.5** 0.372  25.7* 0.347  27.0 
 (11.1)   (10.9)   (11.7)    
Chile 40.5*** 0.366  52.0*** 0.328  41.4*** 0.253  44.6 
 (9.9)   (10.2)   (8.3)    
Denmark 3.5   9.2   7.7   6.8 
 (6.4)   (6.1)   (6.7)    
Hungary 40.6* 0.905  56.2*** 0.582  48.8** 0.850  48.5 
 (17.4)   (17.3)   (16.5)    
Indonesia -31.1*** 0.356  -33.7*** 0.355  -27.2*** 0.310  -30.7 
 (7.9)   (7.9)   (7.9)    
Ireland 34.9*** 0.582  45.2*** 0.491  39.6*** 0.556  39.9 
 (8.7)   (9.7)   (10.1)    
Korea 0.1   -0.5   -3.1   -1.2 
 (16.6)   (13.3)   (13.8)    
Netherlands 5.3   -0.9   14.6   6.3 
 (12.0)   (11.6)   (14.1)    
Portugal 16.2   18.7   14.6   16.5 
 (10.6)   (10.5)   (9.7)    
Slovak 
Republic 
7.1   12.4   11.4   10.3 
(14.5)   (13.1)   (15.3)    
Spain 22.7*** 0.780  30.0*** 0.620  22.4*** 0.795  25.0 
 (3.1)   (3.0)   (3.1)    
Sweden 36.0*** 0.694  45.7*** 0.620  43.8*** 0.555  41.8 
 (9.5)   (9.2)   (9.8)    
Thailand -14.1   3.8   -9.7   -6.7 
 (10.8)   (8.5)   (8.3)    
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
-48.4* 0.327  -75.1** 0.299  -48.4* 0.253  -57.3 
(22.5)   (25.2)   (24.1)    
Mean 16.1 0.509  19.4 0.451  20.6 0.459  18.7 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 3  
Pre-match model 2: Linear regression models, controlling for student covariates and Oaxaca -Blinder 
decomposition of sector endowments and sector achievement advantage 
 Math  Reading  Science 
 (2)  Oaxaca  (2)  Oaxaca  (2)  Oaxaca 
 Sector 
effect 
 Endow-
ments 
Sector 
effect 
 
Sector 
effect 
 Endow-
ments 
Sector 
effect 
 
Sector 
effect 
 Endow-
ments 
Sector 
effect 
Argentina 56.8***  -20.5* -40.0***  71.9***  -27.1*** -50.7***  63.1***  -23.3** -47.0*** 
 (16.7)  (8.6) (10.5)  (17.6)  (8.2) (11.2)  (16.8)  (8.1) (11.2) 
               Australia 9.4  -14.4*** -4.4  17.8*  -18.8*** -10.9*  15.1  -15.1*** -6.80 
 (7.8)  (2.5) (5.2)  (7.8)  (2.4) (5.2)  (7.7)  (2.3) (5.4) 
               
Austria 32.8  -6.5 -9.1  34.4*  -18.3 -17.4  33.5  -7.2 -7.7 
 (17.2)  (12.4) (13.5)  (17.2)  (11.1) (13.0)  (17.5)  (11.7) (11.1) 
               
Belgium 28.1**  -15.4*** -28.1***  29.5**  -16.2*** -24.5***  28.9**  -15.0*** -24.8*** 
 (10.4)  (3.8) (4.4)  (10.1)  (3.1) (4.3)  (10.4)  (3.6) (4.4) 
               
Chile 26.0*  -8.2 -8.9  28.7**  -9.7 -12.9  26.6*  -6.1 -11.4 
 (11.2)  (5.5) (7.4)  (11.1)  (5.6) (7.1)  (10.5)  (5.1) (6.6) 
               
Denmark -2.7  -7.8 -3.0  1.7  -10.6 -6.1  0.23  -13.6* -8.3 
 (6.2)  (5.5) (7.1)  (6.4)  (5.6) (5.6)  (7.8)  (5.9) (7.2) 
               
Hungary 8.0  -15.9 7.0  21.2  -8.6 3.5  17.4  -13.1 6.08 
 (16.8)  (10.4) (12.8)  (14.8)  (9.2) (10.1)  (14.0)  (7.9) (9.0) 
               
Indonesia -19.6**  17.0*** 21.7**  -21.6*  17.1** 24.5**  -17.5*  14.2* 20.8** 
 (7.5)  (4.5) (7.8)  (8.7)  (6.4) (8.8)  (7.6)  (5.8) (8.0) 
               
Ireland 21.6*  -15.3*** -13.7*  24.7**  -16.7*** -13.4*  24.6*  -16.8*** -14.5* 
 (8.5)  (4.2) (5.4)  (9.01)  (4.5) (5.4)  (10.3)  (4.3) (6.3) 
               
Korea 4.8  14.6 2.3  1.17  7.2 1.5  -2.4  10.8 5.24 
 (12.9)  (8.8) (11.3)  (10.6)  (7.4) (8.4)  (10.2)  (7.5) (10.0) 
               
Netherland
s 
8.7  -0.56 14.2  0.37  0.35 13.9  18.7  -0.88 16.3 
 (14.7)  (5.2) (11.2)  (12.7)  (5.1) (12.1)  (18.8)  (5.2) (12.1) 
               
Portugal 22.1**  0.44 -16.4  20.9**  -0.61 -20.8**  18.0*  0.53 -12.2 
 (7.9)  (5.1) (9.1)  (8.1)  (6.1) (7.2)  (7.8)  (4.6) (7.2) 
               
Slovak 
Republic 
-5.3  -17.6 -1.06  -12.2  -25.8* 0.23  -4.91  -10.2 0.60 
(14.1)  (16.0) (13.0)  (14.6)  (12.2) (13.1)  (14.0)  (10.7) (11.2) 
               
Spain 6.9  -21.2*** -4.9  11.6*  -20.8*** -9.4*  6.8  -22.0*** -6.60 
 (4.4)  (3.2) (4.1)  (4.5)  (3.7) (4.3)  (4.7)  (3.6) (4.2) 
               
Sweden 17.14  -22.3* -11.9  23.9*  -22.5 -14.8  22.1  -16.8 -11.1 
 (9.7)  (10.3) (10.1)  (9.5)  (12.6) (8.3)  (14.0)  (12.4) (9.9) 
               
Thailand -28.9*  1.05 22.2*  -10.40  4.7 15.1*  -22.9  0.71 23.1* 
 (13.5)  (7.9) (8.73)  (10.3)  (7.8) (7.2)  (12.4)  (8.06) (9.6) 
               Trinidad & 
Tobago 
-47.5*  -16.6*** 5.04  -70.1*  -15.9*** 12.4*  -45.9  -14.8*** 4.02 
(22.6)  (3.3) (5.1)  (29.7)  (4.2) (5.01)  (25.7)  (3.6) (6.1) 
               
Mean 8.1  -8.7 -4.1  10.2  -10.7 -6.4  10.6  -8.7 -4.3 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 26 No. 105 18 
 
Accounting for peer socioeconomic composition at the school level adds substantial 
explanatory power to the analytic models. In model 1, school sector accounts for only 3.0%, 3.8%, 
and 3.3% of the variation in student math, reading, and science scores, averaged across countries, 
and up to 16.2% in Ireland (reading; Table 4). In most cases, however, after matching, public vs PPP 
school status accounts for a minimal amount of student achievement. In contrast, the peer group 
composition within the school explains a sizable amount of variation in student PISA outcomes. 
Upon addition of the aggregate SES variable to the school-level model, the amount of explained 
variance increases dramatically, from between 7.4% in Indonesia (reading) to 83.1% in Hungary 
(reading). The average share of variance explained by school peer effects, above and beyond that 
explained by the school sector variable is 50.5% in math, 46.5% in reading, and 46.9% in science, 
averaged across countries (Table 4).  
 
Table 4  
Marginal share of variation (Pseudo-R2 change) in PISA performance explained by school sector (pre- and post-
match) and peer effects (post-match) 
  Math  Reading  Science 
    (1) (3)   (1)  (3)   (1)  (3) 
  
Pre-
match 
(sector) 
Post-
match 
(sector) 
Post-
match 
(peer 
effect) 
 
Pre-
match 
(sector) 
Post-
match 
(sector) 
Post-
match 
(peer 
effect)  
 
 
Pre-
match 
(sector) 
Post-
match 
(sector) 
Post-
match 
(peer 
effect)  
Argentina  15.9 5.5 40.7  20.6 8.3 36.3  17.1 5.6 38.3 
Australia  7.5 1.6 44.5  14.7 4.4 45.2  10.5 3.2 51.1 
Austria  3.5 0.2 72.9  5.8 0.1 67.0  5.8 0.1 72.4 
Belgium  2.2 1.0 71.7  3.4 1.7 71.9  2.2 1.1 70.6 
Chile  18.1 9.6 46.9  20.9 11.0 38.6  19.2 13.0 25.9 
Denmark  0.5 2.4 41.0  2.4 0.6 44.5  1.5 1.0 31.5 
Hungary  3.4 0.2 82.3  5.8 0.4 83.1  5.1 0.1 78.2 
Indonesia  12.9 5.8 21.4  15.4 6.2 7.4  11.1 2.9 11.3 
Ireland  15.4 13.0 26.3  19.4 16.2 11.5  15.0 15.1 11.5 
Netherlands  0.1 0.2 49.9  0.1 0.8 48.2  0.7 0.2 44.0 
Portugal  1.3 1.1 59.0  1.7 3.3 53.1  1.3 2.2 62.8 
Slovak Republic 0.2 0.9 60.8  0.7 1.9 51.4  0.4 1.2 64.6 
South Korea  0.1 0.2 65.2  0.1 0.2 73.5  0.01 0.7 75.7 
Spain  8.2 0.2 29.9  14.2 1.3 32.4  8.4 0.3 33.0 
Sweden  9.1 1.7 60.3  14.6 3.9 59.7  11.5 2.0 55.7 
Thailand  0.9 5.2 20.3  0.2 1.1 12.8  0.8 5.6 10.7 
Trinidad & Tobago 3.7 2.4 66.3  6.9 3.9 54.7  3.3 1.8 61.1 
Mean  6.1 3.0 50.5  8.6 3.8 46.5  6.7 3.3 46.9 
Note: The variation listed in column 3 denotes the explained variation added by school aggregate SES in addition to 
school sector. These estimates follow the approach of Bryk & Raudenbush (1992, p. 65) and Singer (1998) for estimating 
pseudo-R2 in multilevel models: (σ2Unconditional Model - σ2Conditional Model) / σ2Unconditional Model. 
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Table 5 
Post-match model 2: linear regression models, controlling for student covariates and Oaxaca -Blinder 
decomposition of sector endowments and sector achievement advantage 
 Math  Reading  Science 
 (2) Oaxaca  (2) Oaxaca  (2) Oaxaca 
 Sector 
effect 
Endow-
ments 
Sector 
effect 
 
Sector 
effect 
Endow-
ments 
Sector 
effect 
 
Sector 
effect 
Endow-
ments 
Sector 
effect 
Argentina 35.7* 1.1 -24.4*  48.4** 0.55 -31.2**  39.2* 0.64 -29.6** 
 (14.8) (7.5) (10.2)  (16.5) (7.1) (10.5)  (16.5) (7.1) (10.8) 
            
Australia 10.0 1.7 -4.1  17.8* 0.80 -10.5*  15.8* 1.0 -6.6 
 (7.9) (2.1) (5.4)  (7.8) (2.3) (5.3)  (7.8) (1.8) (5.6) 
            
Austria -0.23 -2.1 -3.1  4.7 0.12 -12.1  -4.1 -1.7 -1.2 
 (17.2) (11.8) (14.1)  (17.2) (11.5) (13.9)  (17.3) (10.7) (12.4) 
            Belgium 22.7* 1.0 -19.2***  23.9* 1.12 -17.5***  24.3* 1.02 -19.6*** 
 (10.3) (3.8) (4.8)  (9.9) (3.5) (4.8)  (10.3) (3.6) (4.7) 
            Chile 22.1* 1.9 3.0  21.5* 0.44 -2.2  24.4** 2.3 -4.4 
 (9.3) (6.3) (9.6)  (8.6) (7.1) (8.5)  (8.9) (5.5) (8.0) 
            Denmark -6.7 2.0 3.1  -3.7 -0.39 -0.39  -3.0 2.2 -3.1 
 (6.5) (5.4) (8.1)  (7.2) (6.1) (6.9)  (8.6) (6.5) (8.5) 
            Hungary -12.0 1.4 0.71  0.57 1.8 -1.8  -0.13 0.25 -0.04 
 (18.3) (8.1) (13.4)  (15.9) (7.0) (10.8)  (14.7) (5.8) (10.0) 
            Indonesia -14.5 2.3 15.4  -17.5 -0.27 16.8*  -10.5 1.15 13.2 
 (8.2) (3.1) (8.3)  (8.1) (3.1) (8.5)  (8.1) (3.5) (7.6) 
            Ireland 29.8 -15.1 -23.1  28.1 -25.1 -24.1  37.3* -24.9 -32.7 
 (15.7) (17.1) (15.4)  (17.2) (17.2) (15.1)  (18.4) (18.3) (17.3) 
            Korea -1.60 -2.4 5.4  -2.5 -1.31 4.3  -7.4 -1.27 8.7 
 (12.5) (6.7) (10.6)  (9.8) (6.7) (8.5)  (11.2) (6.5) (9.9) 
            Netherlands 10.8 -6.1 12.6  1.7 -5.7 13.1  20.1 -6.7 14.1 
 (14.9) (4.8) (11.2)  (12.9) (4.7) (12.4)  (19.1) (5.0) (12.1) 
            Portugal 16.4 -0.06 -16.8  18.9* -1.9 -20.8*  15.8 -0.06 -12.8 
 (9.1) (5.1) (11.5)  (9.6) (6.0) (10.1)  (9.5) (4.5) (9.4) 
            Slovak 
Republic 
-17.3 -7.3 6.2  -25.6 -7.6 9.4  -18.2 -2.7 11.5 
(15.5) (11.5) (15.6)  (15.5) (9.9) (15.1)  (14.0) (7.6) (12.7) 
            Spain 1.5 -6.2* -1.8  5.3 -5.5* -5.7  1.9 -6.3* -3.6 
 (4.5) (2.7) (4.1)  (4.7) (2.8) (4.3)  (4.8) (2.8) (4.2) 
            Sweden 13.2 -1.2 -6.5  20.1 -2.0 -11.6  17.7 -2.2 -7.4 
 (9.8) (8.0) (12.1)  (10.4) (8.2) (9.6)  (13.8) (9.08) (11.7) 
            Thailand -19.1 -1.6 18.8*  -11.5 -3.1 14.2  -18.9 -1.3 19.6* 
 (14.3) (6.0) (8.7)  (10.4) (5.7) (7.5)  (11.6) (5.0) (9.7) 
            
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
-34.6 -13.0* -9.7  -54.4 -16.1* -6.2  -31.7 -14.4* -12.7 
(22.7) (5.1) (7.3)  (29.6) (6.9) (7.5)  (26.2) (5.8) (8.7) 
            
Mean 3.3 -3.4 64.9  4.4 2.1 62.3  6.0 -1.4 63.6 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6  
Post-match model 3: Linear regression models, controlling for student covariates, school aggregate SES, and 
share of government funding 
 Math  Reading  Science 
 Sector 
effect 
Peer 
effect 
Gov’t 
funding 
 
Sector 
effect 
Peer 
effect 
Gov’t 
funding 
 
Sector 
effect 
Peer 
effect 
Gov’t 
funding 
Argentina 3.4 52.8*** -0.39  11.4 56.3*** -0.52*  3.10 56.8*** -0.35 
 (14.7) (11.1) (0.25)  (16.1) (9.9) (0.24)  (16.5) (10.2) (0.25) 
            
Australia -15.7 59.4*** -0.83**  -7.2 59.9*** -0.76**  -13.1 68.3*** -0.91*** 
 (9.2) (17.5) (0.27)  (8.6) (15.8) (0.29)  (8.5) (16.2) (0.26) 
            
Belgium -1.3 94.4*** -0.54*  4.9 92.5*** 0.10  1.73 95.7*** -0.13 
 (7.8) (6.3) (0.22)  (8.1) (6.4) (0.24)  (7.7) (6.8) (0.22) 
            
Chile 11.7 32.9*** -0.10  13.5 32.1*** 0.14  16.3 27.9*** 0.19 
 (9.3) (9.8) (0.24)  (8.8) (9.4) (0.24)  (9.1) (8.2) (0.26) 
            
Denmark -20.7 29.5** -0.27  -13.1 31.7** -0.06  -12.2 29.9* -0.07 
 (12.9) (10.6) (0.56)  (14.9) (10.6) (0.56)  (15.3) (11.9) (0.61) 
            
Hungary -20.0* 104.8*** 0.09  -8.5 95.3*** 0.12  -6.2 87.3*** 0.39 
 (9.7) (7.8) (0.43)  (8.9) (9.2) (0.51)  (9.9) (9.1) (0.48) 
            
Indonesia -9.5 25.5** -0.073  -13.3 21.8* -0.27  -6.1 24.0** -0.28 
 (8.0) (9.0) (0.16)  (9.5) (10.8) (0.20)  (7.7) (7.4) (0.17) 
            
Ireland 19.6 46.2 -0.29  19.0 30.4 -0.13  24.3 41.8 -0.61 
 (14.5) (25.7) (0.91)  (16.1) (25.6) (0.91)  (16.9) (31.2) (0.99) 
            
Korea 20.9 45.8* -0.98***  16.4 39.9* -0.76***  11.3 38.2 -0.78** 
 (11.4) (19.5) (0.27)  (8.7) (16.0) (0.19)  (11.3) (23.0) (0.25) 
            
Netherlands 8.16 92.9*** 1.80  0.55 81.9*** 1.67  13.2 103.*** 2.11 
 (10.6) (17.0) (1.32)  (9.8) (16.3) (1.2)  (13.2) (22.6) (1.81) 
            
Portugal 21.2* 35.3*** -0.11  24.0* 40.6*** -0.13  19.7* 34.0*** -0.07 
 (8.6) (7.7) (0.24)  (9.4) (8.1) (0.23)  (8.4) (7.3) (0.21) 
            
Slovak Republic 
-5.79 107.0*** 0.55  -13.7 107.9*** 0.39  -7.6 99.2*** 0.55 
(10.4) (15.8) (0.64)  (9.1) (12.8) (0.51)  (10.2) (13.4) (0.56) 
            
Spain -4.90 21.4*** -0.00  0.27 22.2*** 0.10  -4.1 22.7*** 0.038 
 (5.6) (5.8) (0.19)  (5.1) (5.3) (0.19)  (5.4) (5.3) (0.17) 
            
Sweden 1.69 32.3 -2.68*  7.7 31.1 -3.22*  2.0 36.9 -4.36** 
 (11.2) (16.5) (1.35)  (12.8) (20.1) (1.52)  (16.0) (24.0) (1.55) 
            
Thailand -31.0** 14.2 -0.57  -19.8 15.0 -0.26  -28.0* 11.1 -0.56 
 (11.1) (11.9) (0.31)  (10.3) (8.6) (0.28)  (11.2) (9.09) (0.35) 
            
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
-21.8 147.3*** -0.08  -34.9 168.2*** 0.32  -22.0 152.7*** -0.23 
(17.5) (15.8) (0.42)  (23.3) (17.4) (0.50)  (21.2) (17.6) (0.49) 
            
Mean -2.7 58.9 -0.28  -0.78 57.9 -0.20  -0.48 58.1 -0.31 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Effectiveness and equity of PPPs in education 21 
 
While adding levels of explanatory power to the variation in student achievement, the peer 
effect variable also substantially reduces the PPP achievement advantage found previously (Table 4).  
The prior models, which (after propensity score matching) regressed student outcomes on school 
sector while controlling for student characteristics, resulted in 13 significant effects across countries 
and subjects in favor of PPP schools. After matching and controlling for student characteristics, as 
well as accounting for the school level factors of government funding and school aggregate SES, 
private school achievement advantages are only found in a single country—Portugal. In Portugal, 
students in PPP schools outperform those in public schools by 21.2 (0.24 SD), 24.0 (0.27 SD), and 
19.7 (0.23 SD) points (Table 6). In no other country is even a single PPP performance advantage 
found after accounting for sector differences in student characteristics and the composition of peers 
in the school. Similarly, this model produces 3 significant results demonstrating a public school 
achievement advantage. In Hungary public math students perform 20.0 points (0.23 SD) higher than 
their equivalent peers in PPP schools. In Thailand there is a significant public school advantage in 
math (31.0 points; 0.34 SDs) and science (28.0 points; 0.31 SDs).  
These findings suggest that, after accounting for differences in student characteristics 
between school sectors, a large share of the remaining PPP achievement advantage is the result of 
peer group composition rather than any productive efficiency inherent to the sector. The implication 
is that, in the majority of countries, students with similar qualities, and in similar peer-group 
environments, experience no achievement advantage in either the public or government-funded 
private school sector. The effects of accounting for systematic differences in student and peer-group 
characteristics are demonstrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5, which show the change in the school 
sector coefficients (displayed as 95% confidence intervals) between the unconditional school sector 
model and the post-match model accounting for student characteristics, level of government 
funding, and school average SES. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Unconditional PPP school effect (Model 1) 95% confidence intervals (in PISA points) 
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Figure 5. Post-match sector effect (Model 3) 95% confidence intervals (in PISA points), 
controlling for school mean SES and level of government funding  
Limitations 
The study faces a few limitations. First, the primary variable of interest—school sector—
does not provide information sufficient to distinguish between different types of PPP models. It is 
not apparent from the data whether PPP schools receive funding through vouchers, government 
subsidies, or whether they might be classified as charter-type or privately contracted schools. As a 
result, the data only provide the opportunity to assess a generalized view of public-private 
partnership against the traditional school that is publicly-funded and publicly-managed. Future 
studies utilizing more detailed data about PPP policies could substantially improve the current 
knowledge of privatization strategies by distinguishing the performance effects of specific types of 
educational partnerships.  
Second, it cannot be assumed that balance between observable covariates can be equated 
with balance between unobservable covariates that may impact assignment to treatment status 
(Rubin, 1997). Propensity score models are only able to reduce bias insofar as covariates that 
accurately predict the outcome are balanced across treatment and control groups. However, I have 
shown through the empirical research above that, given adequate overlap in the distribution of 
propensity scores, closely matched groups can significantly reduce the selection bias and thus 
produce more accurate estimates of treatment effects than some other techniques (Bai, 2011; 
Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Cochran, 1968; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). At the very least, results 
from the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions provide evidence that a sizable portion of the school 
sector achievement gap is due to the selected set of observed student characteristics (just under 50% 
across countries and subjects where a sector differential exists); as such, there is some level of 
confidence that at least this portion of the selection bias has been reduced. Recognizing that the 
findings may not represent perfect estimates of the treatment effect, I nevertheless move forward 
Effectiveness and equity of PPPs in education 23 
 
under the assumption that the results still offer a policy-relevant perspective on the influence of PPP 
schools on student performance.  
Lastly, one of the primary advantages of using data from the PISA assessment is that large-
scale trends can be assessed across countries. Unfortunately, however, this also makes it difficult to 
consider in detail any of the individual country contexts, to understand the makeup and functioning 
of these education public-private partnerships. I intend for this study to offer a starting point, upon 
which future research can build, to uncover more about the individual PPP models and their 
operation within each of the included countries.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study has provided an examination into the effectiveness of education public-private 
partnerships for producing positive student learning outcomes. Despite the existing economic 
theories, which predict that growth in market involvement will lead to gains in school productivity, 
the findings reinforce the existing mixed evidence on the productive efficiency of education PPPs 
globally. There is no consistent cross-country effect with respect to PPP sector performance. In 
terms of unconditional performance differences, students in PPP schools outperform public 
students in 53% of PISA outcomes across countries. However, a sizable amount of these 
performance differences appear to be attributable to positive student selection into PPP schools. 
After accounting for selection bias through propensity score matching, school sector accounts for 
only 3.4% of the variation in PISA performance. Moreover, after matching, the cross-country 
average PPP coefficient decreased from 18 points (.2 standard deviations) to 4 points (.04 standard 
deviations). Although after matching there remains a PPP performance advantage in 25% of 
outcomes across all countries and subjects, nearly all of these performance differences are accounted 
for by school-level peer group effects. In the majority of cases, after accounting for peer effects, 
students perform as well in public as in PPP schools.  
These findings contribute towards an ongoing discussion of the overall effectiveness of 
school choice and market-based education interventions—that is, whether they increase school 
productivity or simply redistribute educational ability (Bettinger et al., 2010; Epple, Romano, & 
Urquiola, 2015; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006; Uribe et al., 2006). From the productivity perspective, 
school choice and competition are the tide that lifts all boats, raising student performance in both 
the public and private sectors by incentivizing improvements in school innovation, effort, and 
operation. From the redistribution perspective, school choice simply shifts educational talent from 
one set of schools to another, by sorting the most capable students into the most desirable 
institutions. This matters for public policy, because if PPP schools are only more effective due to the 
fact that they systematically select or attract more talented students, then policies aiming to increase 
PPP enrollments will experience diminished effectiveness (Uribe et al., 2006). Such sorting would 
benefit the privileged at the expense of the disadvantaged, and would create negative externalities for 
the larger education system. In this environment, school choice and competition would offer little in 
the way of additive value to the overall improvement of school systems.  
The findings presented above offer evidence in support of the theory of redistribution. In 
the sample of 17 PISA countries, PPP schools appear to be outperforming public schools not 
through any superior or innovative practices, but rather by cream-skimming more capable students 
into the private sector. Enrollment in a PPP school is tied to powerful socioeconomic indicators 
such as student wealth and prior academic ability. This distribution of students is reflected in the 
unconditional performance differences between PPP and public school students. However, PPP 
schools do not appear to be adding any marginal value to their students, beyond what they would 
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receive in the public school system. In short, PPP schools are not improving the productive 
efficiency of most educational systems; and in a majority of countries, they are reinforcing social 
disparities, by disproportionately serving students in the upper income quintiles.  
These findings have direct implications for education policy globally. In much of the existing 
literature, the inclusion of PPPs within education policy frameworks is justified by their potential to 
improve productive efficiency in the education system without negatively impacting social efficiency. 
The findings from this research urge caution against the expectations for superior performance 
within education PPP models. Moreover, governments with policy interest in such interventions 
should be cognizant of the potential impacts of such programs on less-socially-privileged 
populations. For example, Chile’s national voucher system had significantly negative effects on the 
ability for the poorest households to access high-quality educational services (Carnoy, 1998; Verger, 
Bonal, & Zancajo, 2016) until a 2008 revision to the policy increased the funding allotment for the 
poorest students, and in turn, significantly reduced gaps of enrollment and performance for the 
poorest students (Neilson, 2013). Education PPP programs that are most likely to increase both 
social equity and productive efficiency are those which target specific student populations (typically 
based on need). For policy makers, this suggests that governments ought to carefully design 
education PPP programs to be particularly sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable.  
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